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Origins of Pre-Revolutionary Iranian 
Economic Cycles and Policy Response 
Robert E. Looney 
Iran's post-war economic history falls into four rather distinct stages. The first 
covers the period up to 1963 and was characterized by a relatively low rate 
of growth of about 5.5 per cent in constant prices between 1959 and 1963 (1959 
is the starting point for most of the country's macroeconomic data) with nearly 
zero inflation. The second period covered the period 1964-70 (or 1973) and 
was characterized by a high rate of growth, about 10.5 per cent in constant 
prices, and increased inflation. The third phase, 1971-77, was characterized 
by extremely high rates of growth concurrent with a seemingly accelerating 
rate of inflation. The final stage, 1978 to the present, has been one of 
stagnation with high rates of inflation. 
While these dates are somewhat arbitrary, 1 they do delineate four fairly 
distinct periods, each with its own particular characteristics. One thing that 
the first three stages seem to have in common is that during each period the 
economy, despite abundant oil revenues, began to suffer balance of payments 
problems that were both a cause and a consequence of political instability. 
The Iranian economy traditionally was able to absorb far more capital and 
consumer goods imports that it could support through foreign exchange 
earnings, thus forcing the government sooner or later to initiate fairly harsh 
stabilization measures. While much attention has focused on the third stage, 
an examination of the first two, particularly the first, is instructive because 
of the insights provided as to the workings of the economy and the way in 
which the government responded to the economic crisis of 1959, a response 
which perhaps because of its success at that time was not altogether different 
than the policies implemented nearly 20 years later by the government. 
THE REZA SHAH PERIOD 
Although attempts at industrialization and modernization in Iran go back 
to the early 1920s, the idea of economic development within a planning 
framework did not fully materialize until after the Second World War. 
The development policies of the government during the reign of Reza Shah 
(1925 -1941) did not constitute development planning as the term has come 
to be understood in the post-war economic literature. The pre-war policies 
were restricted to partial investment programs for the public sector only, 
with little consideration concerning the activities of the private sector. 
Furthermore, the public sector programs that did exist did not reflect any 
explicitly defined set of policy objecti~s. As a result, the allocation of 
resources was not determined on the basis of any particular investment 
criterion. A number of specific investment projects in different sectors were 
implemented without giving sufficient consideration to their inter-relationships 
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or their overall effects on such things as the level and distribution of national 
income.2 
What is of interest in terms of the present study, however, is the fact that 
this period developed the framework for the development strategy the country 
was to follow until the time of the revolution. More specifically, the primary 
development objectives of the period were rapid industrialization and the 
development of the country's infrastructure, while agriculture was by and large 
ignored. The most important policy instruments of the prewar period, aside 
from the investment programs, included tax rates, wage and price controls, 
as well as government controls over the various aspects of foreign trade. 
Economic policy under Reza Shah was also characterized by the establishment 
of a state monopoly over foreign trade. This was a period before oil revenues 
had a significant impact on government finances. Most of the expense of these 
early development efforts was financed through the imposition of a tax on 
tea and sugar. 3 
Evaluations of Reza Shah's approach to economic reform have been 
extremely varied with Lambton's observation perhaps the most insightful: 
In spite of the apparent progress achieved during the reign of Reza Shah, 
and although Persia had become more conscious of her new role as a 
national state belonging to Western Society she had not yet found a 
sound basis for her new life, nor had she achieved a synthesis between 
the basis of Wes tern Society and Persian tradition. The house had been 
swept of much of the past that remained but nothing solid had been put 
in its place. 4 
Variations of this theme have been expressed by others5 all with the general 
thrust that Reza Shah's reforms were carried out at too rapid a pace, and much 
that was old was removed with not enough that was new put in its place -
a view which we will find has also been used to describe his son's approach 
to the country's economic development. 
THE FIRST DEVELOPMENT PLAN PERIOD (1949-1955) 
The First Seven Year Development Plan was approved by the Iranian Parlia-
ment in 1949. Critics have described the plan as deficient both in basic planning 
methodology and objectives. While this issue is certainly debatable, it is clear 
that the plan was largely partial and did not take into account the role of 
investment by the private sector. In effect the plan was a collection of 
infrastructure projects to be executed by the newly established Plan Organ-
ization. The 1951-53 crisis over oil nationalization and the subsequent loss 
of oil revenues made the actual implementation of the plan impossible. 
The interruption of oil production during the period of political instability 
and unrest accompanying the premiership of Mohammed Mossadegh ended 
with the signing in October 1954 of an agreement between the Iranian govern-
ment and a consortium of oil companies. Production increased rapidly after 
the new agreement, but it was not until 1957 that the 1950 (the last pre-
disturbance year) level was reached. The agreement between Iran and the 
Consortium provided the country a royalty roughly one-half the difference 
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between the 'market value' of oil produced and the cost of production; i.e., 
one-half of the consortium's profits. Officially, Iran's share of the oil profits 
were paid in sterling, but could be transferred into other currencies at the 
request of the government. 
Because nearly all of the government's expenditures were in local currency, 
the oil revenues had to be converted into rials. This was done through direct 
purchases from Bank Melli, and the rials thus obtained aggregated with general 
tax revenues. Economically, rials obtained in this manner had to have an 
inflationary impact on the economy because they did not (as is the case with 
taxes) have an offsetting component elsewhere in the country's income stream; 
i.e., they represented net injections to expenditure. The presumption was, of 
course, that private sector imports would ultimately fulfill the role of offsetting 
income stream leakages. And while the private sector did respond by acceler-
ating its level of inputs, inflationary pressures soon developed.6 
Iran's exchange rate during this period mirrored to a certain extent 
developments in the oil sector. From March 1946 to March 1956 the country 
had a de facto multiple exchange rate system. Both imports and exports were 
classified into several categories, and certificates for each class were required 
since the price of certificates varied from category to category (and given that 
Bank Melli was their sole buyer and seller), the system of certificates acted 
as a form of multiple exchange rates. From 1954 the rial began to strengthen 
and the country was able to initiate a single rate. The free market rate, except 
at odd times (e.g., when a decline in the price of oil was forecast) differed 
little from the official rate.7 
Despite the resumption of oil production in 1954, the economy continued 
to languish. Commenting on the situation at the end of the first plan period, 
Jahangir Amuzegar noted that despite the government's concerted efforts both 
before and after the war, its plans and programs did not seem to have achieved 
their proclaimed objective of improving the living conditions of the Iranian 
masses. 'Although there is no statistical proof, there seems to be conclusive 
evidence that in the last thirty years the lot of the average individual in Iran 
has deteriorated and the inequalities in the distribution of wealth and income 
have been intensified. ' 8 As an explanation Amuzegar speculated that: 
Among the greatest barriers to Iran's economic development are certain 
aspects of the Iranian mentality. Three-fourths of Iran's population 
are poor, illiterate farm workers living in widely scattered villages 
throughout the country. Many are sharecroppers; others are mainly 
landless peasants and tribesmen. Protracted poverty, chronic diseases, 
ignorance and isolation have made these people stagnant, custom ridden, 
and superstitious. Their modus vivendi based on fear, suspicion and 
insecurity has begotten attitudes of subservience, apathy, and individual-
istic self-interestedness. Although not inherently lazy nor necessarily 
content with their lot, they seem to have lost individual initiative, 
and become apathetic to hard work and outwardly fatalistic toward 
discomfort.9 ' 
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THE SECOND DEVELOPMENT PLAN (1955-62) 
After the overthrow of the Mossadegh government and the subsequent 
resumption of oil production and export in 1954, development efforts began 
anew. A Second Plan, largely financed out of oil revenues, was drawn up and 
initiated in 1955. 
As was the case with the First Plan, emphas.is was given to infrastructural 
projects. Similarly, investments for inclusion in the plan were chosen without 
any particular systematic framework in which their simultaneous impacts could 
be assessed and evaluated; i.e., the plan was largely a set of independent 
projects, whose main commonality was that they had been easy to identify. 
Almost all the plan's allocation to the agricultural sector went to three large 
dams, Karaj, Safid Rud and Dez. Similarly, allocations in the industrial sector 
were concentrated in several major projects, the construction or modernization 
of large textile, sugar and cement factories. Transportation and communi-
cation projects were confined to construction of inner city highways and the 
extension of the railway network, with little attention given to feeder roads 
and other rural projects. 
As revealed by actual choices, therefore, it seems that the overall tendency 
of the planners was to select projects with low value added returns and low 
employment generating effects. As a result the investment program was 
dominated by the relatively few capital intensive projects. In sum the invest-
ment program had all the shortcomings of an unintegrated public investment 
program prepared on the basis of the so-called project-by-project approach 
characteristic of the lack of a clearly defined development policy .10 
It cannot be denied, however, that the task of designing a good develop-
ment plan in Iran at this time was indeed difficult. The lack of both statistical 
data and familiarity with planning methodology and techniques were a major 
limitation. In addition the overriding aim ·of the government at the time seemed 
simply one of initiating an investment program of some sort and as soon as 
possible. It was the size rather than the composition of expenditures which 
received the highest official consideration. As a result most of the basic 
planning issues were not even raised, and the Second Plan was destined from 
its very inception not to satisfy the attributes (such as efficiency and internal 
consistency) of a well designed development plan. 11 
More fundamentally, however, the somewhat capricious attitude of the 
government toward planning at this time undoubtedly stemmed from the fact 
that political power, the commitment of which was necessary if planned 
economic development was to be achieved, was difficult to locate and define. 
The Shah was obviously much more than a constitutional monarch, but clearly 
did not have absolute power. He had to act within certain indeterminate 
boundaries not easily definable even for him. On the other hand, genuine 
democratic institutions were non-existent. Political power appeared to rest 
on a very precarious set of balances among the dynasty, the feudal landlords, 
the army, the clergy, and the emerging new U<ban classes among which as yet 
only the merchants and intellectuals seemed to exert any major political 
influence. 12 
By the late 1950s these power groups (none of which was very homogeneous) 
.. 
ORIGINS OF IRANIAN ECONOMIC CYCLES 87 
had more or less successfully kept each other in check. This type of environ-
ment was obviously not conducive to planned economic development. Further 
the balance between the different groups was not only precarious but also 
contained a number of inner contradictions many of which were never 
effectively resolved. It is little wonder therefore that the first two plans had 
vaguely stated objectives with no apparent focus. 
Plan Financing 
In terms of the financing of the plan, the government's oil revenues at the 
time were divided among three agencies: the Plan Organization, the Ministry 
of Finance, and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), with about 80 
per cent going to the Plan Organization. Subsequently, the Plan Organization's 
share was reduced (only to be restored again in the late 1960s). The reduction 
in Plan Organization allocations appears to have not only reduced its im-
plementation capability at the time but more importantly was an indicator 
of the attitudes towards development that prevailed among some of the leading 
government officials. 
Several technical aspects surrounding the oil agreements are of interest. The 
consortium-oil revenue-government expenditure linkage meant that in effect 
the government agencies that converted their share of the oil revenues to rials 
(denominated in sterling) would, in contrast to the usual situation in developing 
countries, benefit directly from a devaluation of the rial; i.e., they would 
receive more rials for the same quality of oil receipts. This situation created 
a set of incentives whereby devaluation could then increase the Plan Organ-
ization and Ministry of Finance's imports (because a smaller amount of oil 
revenue would be required to obtain the necessary rials). If after devaluation 
the private sector continued to buy all the foreign exchange the public sector 
offered, then devaluation would be in effect a tax on the private sector. 
A revaluation of the rial in terms of gold would, of course, produce a 
windfall gain, and this was in fact what the government did. By setting the 
buying and selling rates of the rial at 75 and 76.5, respectively, the authorities 
created a disparity in the gold-rial rate; i.e., the gold content of the rial still 
implied an official exchange rate of 32.25 rials per dollar. In order to bring 
the gold content rate into equality with the actual rate at which the currencies 
were exchanged, the rial was revalued in terms of gold during May 1957. The 
result was to release 7 .1 billion rials ($95 million of gold) from notecover; i.e., 
approximately $95 million in gold which at the previous gold content exchange 
rate (32.25 rials per dollar) was required under existing law to be· as note-cover 
was under the new gold content exchange rate (7 5. 7 5 rials per dollar) released 
for other uses. Most of the revaluation windfall was allocated for loans to 
agriculture, and industry for the purchase of equipment. 
It has been argued that the revaluation of the rial was used to provide 
the rationale needed by the authorities to accelerate the expansion of the 
money supply (by the amount equivalent to the rise in the rial value of 
the country's stock of gold and foreign e~change). 13 In any case, the change 
in the rial rate did mean a considerable once-and-for-all rise in rial revenues 
of the government and a subsequent rise in its level of expenditure. It is 
clear, of course, that the so-called revaluation-financed projects were no 
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different from the government undertaking its increased expenditures by simp-
ly printing money. 
Whatever its motives, the net effect of the government's manipulations was 
to facilitate the expansion of credit to the private sector. Loans extended to 
the private sector increased by 46.1 per cent in 1957, 60.5 per cent in 1958, 
and 32.4 per cent in 1959. The industrial loans financed through the banking 
system were limited to one-third of the total investment of the project in an 
attempt to attract a significant amount of personal and business savings into 
productive capital formation. 
Rising government expenditures together with the unprecedented expansion 
in private-sector credit produced Iran's first major economic boom during 
this period. Expansion was most pronounced in both urban housing and 
industry. Private sector investment in construction in Tehran, for example, 
rose by 85 per cent and 130 per cent in 1958 and 1959, respectively. In addition 
to the government's fiscal actions, the expansion was aided by a major 
liberalization of restrictions on the importation of capital equipment. Rising 
aggregate demand, cheap Joans and increased imports combined to sustain 
the investment boom for several years. The most rapidly expanding areas for 
investment appear to have been the more traditional ones of textiles, cement, 
sugar refining, leather, bricks, etc. Furthermore, investment during this period 
was largely for plant expansion or new plants built by individuals or concerns 
that already were operating similar plants. 
It is significant that few firms owned or controlled by new entrepreneurs 
came into existence during the investment boom, suggesting that the type of 
entrepreneurs willing to venture into new areas or take great risks were in short 
supply at this time. The failure of the system to induce diversification and 
greater private sector response to new productive investment opportunities 
exposed what was over the years probably to become the major shortcoming 
inherent in the country's economic system. 
Inflationary Pressures 
By the late 1950s the point had apparently been reached where even the 
expanded growth of imports could not prevent inflation from increasing at 
rates significantly over its historical pattern (although at a rate still somewhat 
below that experienced by many other countries at the time). 
Since the economy still had a relatively simple structure at the time, it is 
tempting to explain this inflationary surge as simply one of excess demand. 
A closer examination of what information is available for the period indicates 
that while the demand-pull mechanism was important, other factors were also 
at work. For instance, if excess demand were the sole cause of inflation at 
this time, imports should have increased even more than they did. Prices rose 
by only one per cent in 1959, partially because imports increased by roughly 
one-third during that year. A year later, however, the price level had risen 
by 10 per cent, yet imports had expanded by only 10 per cent. 
Given the limited data covering this perfod, one can only speculate as to 
the reasons for the deceleration in import growth. Clearly the drop in foreign 
assets of the banking system did contribute to the decline, falling as they did 
from 16.41 billion rials in 1959 to 11.40 billion in 1960. Another contributing 
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factor could have been the effect on demand of changes in the distribution 
of income that was taking place at the time. Employment was increasing 
rapidly in urban areas. In 1960 the lower range of wage rates for urban jobs 
averaged from 20 to 60 rials per day. Given the relatively high price level of 
most imported goods, however, an increase of wages at rates of even 10 to 
20 per cent would probably be sufficient to shift this income group's profile 
of demand significantly from domestic to foreign goods. Instead, the increased 
demand originating in the upward wage movements was likely to remain 
concentrated in domestic consumer goods, thus preventing excess demand 
from spilling over into imports. 
On the other hand increases in incomes of the upper and middle income 
groups seem to have resulted in increased demand for consumer durables, 
higher quality textiles and food products, much of which were imported. And 
as already noted most new investments during this period relied on imported 
capital equipment. If rising incomes of the higher income groups and the 
acceleration in private investment did in fact cause the import boom of 1959, 
a deceleration in investment activity thereby reducing not only imports but 
also upward pressure on the lower end of the wage scale would be expected 
to lessen the upward pressure on prices. If in fact these patterns were at work, 
unused capacity - i.e., unused foreign exchange - would probably 
materialize. In fact, foreign assets of the banking system increased from 11.40 
billion rials at the end of March 1960 to 15.88 by the end of 1961. 
Balance of Payments Problems 
Beginning in 1959 the total balance of payments deficit began to accelerate 
rapidly. The cumulative short fall for 1958-61 amounting to around $276 
million, therefore, had to be financed through the running down of reserves. 
Indeed the four-year deficit was $51.6 million greater than the surplus built 
up during the preceding four years. By the end of 1960 the country had only 
enough foreign exchange to finance several weeks' essential imports. 
The main source of this mounting payments deficit was clearly the rising 
trade deficit. The latter deficit can in turn be traced to the uncontrolled 
expansion of imports and the stagnant level of exports (Table 1), the combi-
nation of which led to deficits much over their historical levels. 
How did the situation reach this state? As George Baldwin notes, it was 
not because no one realized what was going on: 
The trade and payments statistics were certainly good enough to have 
warned what was happening. Nor was it becattse there were no Iranian 
officials who recognized the danger signals and argued for more prudent 
policies toward imports and the casual assumption of foreign debt. The 
1958-61 payments slide was essentially one more symptom of the general 
condition of Iranian politics during this period: a few sensible people 
who understood were not in positions of political control, and the people 
in positions of control either did n(>t understand or would not listen. 
If real trouble developed, the authorities seemed to think new loans 
would always be arranged or that the American Government would buy 
the country back from the brink, or the oil revenues might be pushed 
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TABLE 1 
















Source: George Baldwin, Planning and Development In Iran (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
1967), p. 59. 
up by pressuring the Consortium for higher prices. As a last resort 
officials could resign and turn the mess over to someone else. All these 
remedies were tried. The Iranian talent for ingenious maneuver under 
pressure succeeded in confining the financial crisis and avoided the 
rupture with her principal foreign creditors which clearly threatened. 14 
By the end of 1960, therefore, the monetary induced boom had come to 
its inevitable end with the country facing both excessively rising prices and 
a large and growing current account deficit. The government was forced to 
embark on a now famous economic stabilization program initiated by the 
International Monetary Fund. This. program consisted of a set of standard 
IMF measures including direct control of private sector credit, the raising of 
interest rates, the restriction of imports, and forced reductions in government 
expenditures. 
As a result of these measures, the boom of 1957-60 was soon turned into 
a deep recession. Real private sector gross domestic fixed capital formation 
declined by 7. 7 per cent and 9.5 per cent in 1961and1962, respectively. Public 
sector investment also dropped by 11.6 per cent in 1962. The more traditional 
sectors, such as agriculture, construction and domestic trade were most 
seriously affected by the recession. Domestic trade (which covers the economic 
activities of the bazaar) probably suffered the most because it bore the full 
brunt of the plan's import and credit restriction measures. In fact, the value 
added in trade actually declined by 2-3 per cent in 1961, while showing only 
a marginal increase in 1962. The modern sector, it appears, fared much better 
during the recession with the value added of manufacturing and mining 
(excluding oil) increasing in real terms by 8.4 per cent and 13.6 per cent in 
the depressed years of 1961 and 1962, respectively. 
The asymmetrical impact of the stabilization program upon the traditional 
and the modern sectors of the economy inevitably created a number of social 
and economic problems. Most serious in this regard was the growing mass 
discontent among both low-income urban gr~ups (a large proportion of whom 
were unemployed migrant construction workers) and the bazaar merchants 
(who as a group had been the most severely affected by the government 
stabilization program). 
' 
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The administration's response to the deteriorating conditions was the 
introduction of a number of reforms including: 
1. land reform 
2. profit sharing in industry 
3. female suffrage 
4. nationalization of forests 
5. return of state industries to private enterprise 
6. the formation of a literacy corps 
The reforms were clearly a real threat to the interests of the landed upper and 
propertied middle class and certainly perceived that way by them. Thus, instead 
of relieving the social tensions, the economic and political uncertainties created 
by their initiation may in fact have aggravated certain groups to the point of 
reviving old alliances, particularly that between the ulama and the bazaar 
merchants, especially in regard to their joint opposition to the regime. The 
culmination of unrest was a series of mass demonstrations against the regime 
in June 1963. In contrast to those nearly 15 years later, these were quickly 
and brutally suppressed. 
EMERGING DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS 
The late 1950 to early 1960 period is of interest because several patterns 
emerged from the country's first attempt at accelerated growth during this 
period that were ultimately to be repeated on a much larger scale in 1978-79. 
Of special note in this regard is: (1) the role of the oil sector in the economy, 
and (2) the rigidity of indigenous institutions to economic growth. 
Role of the Oil Sector 
The main characteristic of the oil sector at this time (and to this day as far 
as that is concerned) was that it wa's in no sense indigenous to the economy, 
but rather superimposed on it. Although output was increasing rapidly and 
investment in the sector was also accelerating in the industry, it did not provide 
the nucleus around which the entire economy could develop. While this pattern 
is typical world-wide, it was undoubtedly intensified in Iran due to the 
country's predominantly rural agricultural village oriented social and economic 
system. Because most village inhabitants had no contacts beyond their 
immediate village whatever potential spread the oil sector may have had were 
quickly dissipated. Since farming methods with several exceptions were 
primitive, levels of income in rural areas remained very low. As a result most 
of the economy imposed few demands on the oil industry, and responded little 
if at all to increases in the supply of oil or to the demands for skilled labor 
and other inputs generated by that industry. 
In fact after six decades of operations the petroleum sector remained a 
virtual appendage to the Iranian economy, with little direct impact on the 
industrialization of the economy. The bulk of the requirements of the oil 
industry consisted of capital goods which were imported duty free including 
parts and equipment required in the operation of the refineries, the oil fields, 
and pipeline transportation. Thus, for the period 1962-66, 88.3 per cent 
of the total purchases of the consortium of foreign oil companies and an 
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estimated 90. 7 per cent of those of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) 
were foreign. 15 
In short, the oil industry did not play a leading sector role similar to that 
played by the textile, iron and steel, railroad and automobile industries in the 
earlier stages of the development of some of the Western nations. The industry 
was important, therefore, largely in Iran's development program because it 
provided a source of easily controlled and eas'ily mobilized revenue for the 
government and a supply of foreign exchange greatly in excess of what the 
indigenous Iranian industries could possibly earn and not because it imparted 
directly its dynamism to the rest of the economy. 
Institution Building 
In terms of its institutional development, it is clear the country was not at the 
'take off' stage at this time. Not only was the economy extremely rigid and 
unresponsive but perhaps just as significant the country's social arrangements 
remained deeply engrained in forms that were the virtual antithesis of those 
required to facilitate economic growth. Those more perceptive in the govern-
ment undoubtedly saw as an immediate goal not one of sustained equilibrium 
growth but more realistically a limited one of uprooting and eventually 
replacing a mode of behavior and set of institutions that had become establish-
ed over centuries of static economic performance. 
More specifically, while the rural groups remained tradition bound, most 
of the urban population living as they had for centuries through successive 
periods of invasions, civil wars, and political instability had become distrustful, 
self-interested and cynical. Iranian businessmen had grave misgivings about 
prospective partners and generally minded their own businesses, often with-
drawing from large scale cooperative endeavors. Conservatism, drive for quick 
profits and a high discount of the future were their common characteristics. 
On the other hand, while the bureau·crats and the ruling intelligentsia were 
informed, educated and ambitious, they often tended towards pessimism and 
despair. Living in their country's glorious past and disappointed with its plight 
at the time, they frequently sought scapegoats, and tended to blame their 
troubles on anything and anyone but themselves. Fearful and suspicious, they 
questioned the motives and mistrusted the counsel of others. An extreme 
sensitivity to defeat and failure made them fearful of trying new things. 
The majority lacked initiative for constructive action, risk-taking and free 
enterprise. 16 
Based on its actions at the time the government seems to have opted for 
a development strategy that would attempt to achieve high growth with 
institutional change; i.e., its strategy was apparently designed so that the 
process of accelerating economic change would also undermine many if not 
all of these institutions. The ultimate goal of this institution-destroying phase 
was undoubtedly the creation of an atmosphere that would permit rapid 
development of modern westernized groups possessing progressive attitudes 
towards change and with access to positions of importance. 
For example, projects that resulted in increasing inconsistencies with respect 
to the prevailing social and economic arrangements; i.e., a road building 
program that made tribal life a little more bearable, a rural credit program 
.>-•. ~~""-- ~.--~t.::::S:-~.--~---.--:£~:_:~::.;;_-~~~---< -:-<-· 
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that reduced the dependence of the peasant on the landlord, a village electrifi-
cation program that relieves a bit of the drabness of the daily routine were 
seen by the authorities as ultimately transforming existing attitudes and socio-
economic relationships in the country towards arrangements more compatible 
with increases in material well-being. 17 
CONCLUSION 
Despite its increased oil revenues, Iran began to experience a number of 
difficulties during the Second Plan period, including strong inflationary 
pressures and a rapid fall of official foreign exchange reserves. Interestingly 
enough, these problems do not seem to have been caused exclusively by the 
government's excess spending, but instead appear to have their origin in more 
fundamental structural problems characterizing the economy at this time. 
There is no doubt that the sharp reversal of 1960-62 was crucial in 
fomenting not only increased revolutionary action but also in the creation of 
a fairly broadbased opposition to the regime. The recession of 1960-62, 
however could not have brought about the level of 1962-63 internal strife 
by itself. Clearly, the role of the religious groups in the organization of political 
opposition and their mobilization of the masses was a crucial element. 18 
As in 1978 it was the development of adverse socio-economic conditions that 
provided the appropriate environment for the ulama's particular brand of 
opposition to flourish and eventually succeed. The government's harsh 
suppression of the 1963 demonstrations undoubtedly enhanced the position 
of the leading religious groups giving the impetus to the ulama's opposition 
to the Shah's regime which was to be so crucial in the February 1979 revolution 
and its aftermath. 
The general conclusion that emerges from this discussion as to the progress 
made by the country towards development by the early 1960s depends very 
much on how one views the development process. The growth in output that 
took place in the late 1950s and early 1960s was limited to a handful of 
traditional Iranian products and industries. At the same time, the major sector 
of the economy, agriculture, remained virtually stagnant. No new, dynamic 
sector had been stimulated by the increase in oil revenues and the unwillingness 
of entrepreneurs to assume risks in undertaking new productive investments 
cast some doubt on the contribution the private sector was willing and able 
to make to future growth. Inflation was also beginning to be associated with 
the country's growth process and had reached levels that were quite likely to 
be inconsistent with long-term continuous growth. Worse yet, instead of being 
eliminated by the availability of foreign exchange, price increases seemed at 
times to be fostered by that availability, in that increases in foreign exchange 
permitted expanded employment and wage bill. The resulting distribution of 
income caused the demand for domestically produced commodities to expand 
at a rate faster than supply. This situation was to be repeated a number of 
times over the years. • 
Despite the far-reaching impact that the resumption in oil revenues was to 
have on the economy, the process of oil-induced economic development had 
certain ramifications. As oil came to be the initiator of the country's economic 
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development, the accompanying structure of production and trade began 
to evolve in a very artificial environment - one in which certain built-in 
distortions not only seemed inevitable but were at the time looked upon by 
many in the government as beneficial to the whole modernization process. 
In general, governmental policy formulation together with the country's 
industrialization process based on oil-induced distortions not only impeded 
the process of diversified economic development but actually created a 
productive structure that was inherently stagnation-prone. 
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